FireFly Robotics
The Company Gets No Money
From This Listing.
Its Lender Has the Most
Shares Registered.
On October 7, 2026, FireFly Robotics filed an S-1 with the SEC for a listing on Nasdaq. On October 27 it filed an amendment (S-1/A, dated October 26); this article is based on the amendment. It is a company in Salt Lake City, Utah, that builds machines that harvest turf and electric mowers that cut golf course grass without an operator. It began operations in 2010. As of June 30, 2026, it had 213 full-time employees.
In this filing the company is not selling a single share. What is registered is only the resale of up to 27.12 million shares by stockholders. That number includes shares that will be newly issued when preferred stock is converted. No bank buys the shares to resell them (there is no firm-commitment underwriting); the form is what is called a direct listing. When stockholders sell, the proceeds do not go to the company.
In the stockholder table, the holding with the most shares registered is the one gathered under the name of ATW Partners. Of the 27.12 million shares registered, 13.29 million, about 49%, are for ATW. In the prospectus, ATW means certain funds affiliated with ATW Partners; they have bought the company’s convertible debentures since 2019. Immediately before the listing, ATW will exchange part of the debentures and part of the warrants for preferred stock, and exercise the rest of the warrants for common stock. According to the prospectus, those shares, apart from 850,000, generally cannot be sold for 20 days from the listing. After that, until 12 months have passed, there is a cap on how much can be sold.
The numbers of the business have two sides. There has not been a profitable year since it began operations, and the auditor wrote that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern. On the other side, it sold 56 autonomous mowers in the first half of 2026, more than double the 25 of the same period a year earlier. In the same six months its operating loss narrowed from $4.58 million to $2.73 million.
Ten questions. We lay out only what the S-1/A says.
Question 1
What is this company, really?
Primary source · from the S-1/A
Prospectus Summary (Company Overview, Our Products, p.1 onward), Business (p.70 onward) — from the S-1/A
In one line: a company that builds a machine that harvests turf and a machine that mows it without an operator.
There are two product lines. One is the harvester sold to turf farms; the other is the autonomous electric mower sold to golf courses. Design, manufacturing and sales are carried out at one facility in Salt Lake City. Service, too, is handled in-house, without dealers.
A turf farm lifts the grass it has grown off the ground, cuts it to a set shape and ships it. The company’s harvester (the prospectus calls it the Manned Robotic Harvester) carries one person. The machine does the lifting, cutting, rolling and stacking onto a pallet. According to customers, the prospectus says, work done by two to ten people became a one-person job.
The autonomous mower (the Autonomous Mowing Platform) runs on a battery. It cuts a swath 100 inches wide. It needs one learning pass around the outer boundary of the area to be mowed; after that the user picks a starting place and a mow pattern on a screen, and the machine mows on its own.
It operates for four to six hours on one charge. In that time, the company believes, it can mow 20 to 25 acres.
The company introduces itself as an agricultural technology and robotics company with a primary focus on autonomous and semi-autonomous robotics for golf and turf care. In June 2026 it changed its name from FireFly Automatix to FireFly Robotics.
By revenue, though, the largest line is the harvester. Of 2025 revenue, harvesters were approximately 54%, parts 20% and autonomous mowers 16%. In the first half of 2026, harvesters were about 42% and autonomous mowers about 28%.
The machines in service around the world numbered over 900 as of June 30, 2026 (the company’s estimate). More than 750 harvesters are operating. Approximately 130 autonomous mowers have been delivered so far.
It calls itself a robotics company. A little over half of 2025 revenue came from a robotic harvester that one person rides.
Question 2
What does it compete on?
Primary source · from the S-1/A
Business (Our Products, Competition, p.74 onward), Prospectus Summary (Our Competitive Strengths, p.7) — from the S-1/A
This article looks at three things it competes on: the electric motion control it has used in harvesters, a design with no hydraulics, and building in-house.
The prospectus lists six strengths. From that list and from the description of the business, this article takes up three points that bear on the products.
What it learned on the harvester went into the mower
The harvester came first. The company first shipped a model called the ProSlab in 2012. Today’s harvesters are diesel-electric hybrids, and electric motors finely control the motions of cutting and stacking the turf.
Its experience with electric motion control in the harvesters, the prospectus says, facilitated the adoption of similar technology in the autonomous mowers. Because design and manufacturing are in-house, the company explains, it can more rapidly incorporate product and technology improvements across its products.
The harvester’s engine is 74 horsepower. The closest competitors’ machines generally use 130 to 140 horsepower, the company writes. Fuel averages 2.0 gallons per hour, against an estimated average of 4.3 gallons for its main competitors. Competitors’ harvesters, it also says, generally require two to three people to operate.
These are the company’s own comparisons. The competitors’ fuel figure is the company’s estimate.
A mower with no hydraulics
The autonomous mower has no engine and no hydraulic system. The prospectus shows a photograph of a hydraulic oil spill left on turf by a traditional mowing machine and explains that its design eliminates spills of this kind.
The cutting width is 100 inches. The nearest competitors’ autonomous mowers generally provide 60 inches or less, the company writes.
The company believes there are “no current direct competitors” for its autonomous mower in the turfgrass mowing industry. In the same sentence it says it anticipates competition from traditional manufacturers such as Toro, Deere and Husqvarna. The Business section says many of its competitors are much larger and have significantly greater resources; the risk factors put it as “some” of its competitors and potential competitors. The risk factors also say some competitors are in the process of introducing automated mowers.
17,500 components, one facility
The facility is 108,500 square feet. Design, development, manufacturing and sales are done here. The company manages over 17,500 individual components on a daily basis. Sales, deliveries and service are also managed in-house, without relying on third-party distributors.
But it does not make everything itself. It buys raw materials and some components from outside. It does not control their manufacturing, pricing or delivery, the prospectus cautions.
It holds 35 granted patents in the U.S.
From electric motion control on the harvester to a mower with no operator. The comparisons with competitors are numbers the company wrote.
Question 3
How big is the market?
Primary source · from the S-1/A
Business (Our Business, Our Market Opportunity, p.70 onward) — from the S-1/A
The market the company puts forward is about $60 billion. It is the figure if every machine were replaced with its own.
The prospectus estimates the total addressable market (TAM) at approximately $60 billion in total. It breaks down into approximately $27 billion for golf courses, approximately $29 billion for mowing at airports, parks, schools and the like, and approximately $3 billion for turf harvesting.
The method is written out in the prospectus. It assumes that all the machines in the identified markets were replaced with the company’s machines, and multiplies the number of machines by the average selling price of its machines.
There are 38,000 golf courses in the world. In its table, the company puts the mowers used on them at 152,000 to 171,000, multiplies by an expected average selling price of $160,000 to $175,000 per machine, and arrives at $24.3 billion to $29.9 billion.
Other sites are handled the same way. The number of machines per site is an assumption the company developed internally.
- 36,000 airports and airfields: 72,000 to 108,000 machines
- 128,000 U.S. schools: 32,000 to 96,000 machines
- 23,000 city parks: 5,750 to 17,250 machines
Against that, as of June 5, 2026, the autonomous mower was in use at 76 country clubs and golf courses. Approximately 130 have been delivered so far.
For the harvester, the company counts 1,447 turf farms in the United States, 247 in Canada, 189 in Australia and 700 in Europe, and estimates the market at about $2.0 billion to $4.3 billion.
$60 billion is the number if everything were replaced. In use as of June 2026: 76 sites.
Question 4
Who actually uses it?
Primary source · from the S-1/A
MD&A (Company Overview, Revenues, p.50 onward), Notes to the financial statements (concentration of risk, revenue by geography; F pages) — from the S-1/A
The buyers are golf courses and turf farms. The prospectus does not name a single customer.
The buyers of the autonomous mower are golf courses and country clubs. As of June 5, 2026, 76 were using it. The golf courses maintained by the company’s autonomous mowers are in the United States, Australia, Canada and Mexico.
The buyers of the harvester are turf farms. Besides the United States, harvesters are operating in Australia, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Canada, South Africa, Israel and Mexico. The autonomous mower is also operating on three turf farms.
In 2025, nine-tenths of revenue was from the United States. Of revenue of $47.18 million, the United States accounted for $42.53 million. Australia followed with $2.03 million, Europe with $1.12 million and Canada with $1.06 million. In the first half of 2026 the U.S. share was about 84%.
Dependence on particular customers does not show in revenue. In both 2024 and 2025, no one customer accounted for more than 10% of revenues, the notes say. In accounts receivable, though, four customers accounted for 60% of the balance at the end of 2025.
Neither a golf course nor a turf farm is named in the prospectus. Of the golf courses that use the mower, it goes no further than “prominent country clubs and golf courses”.
From “does it work” to “which one to standardize on”
The company writes that the way golf courses buy has changed.
This is the company’s view. What is given as numbers is units sold and the order backlog. The backlog at June 30, 2026 was 76 units, more than the 56 sold in the same six months.
Of the harvester’s customers it writes differently. Turf farms, the company says, “remain cautious” in making capital expenditure decisions.
In 2025, nine-tenths of revenue was from the United States. No customer above one-tenth in 2024 or 2025. And no customer is named.
Question 5
How does it make money?
Primary source · from the S-1/A
MD&A (Revenues, p.55 onward), Prospectus Summary (p.8) and Business (the revenue chart, p.78) — from the S-1/A
It earns by selling machines outright. Units and price per unit are written in the prospectus.
The core of revenue is the price of machines sold. Parts, shipping, service and software subscriptions follow. The table below is the breakdown.
| Item | 2024 | 2025 | H1 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Harvesters | $25,325K | $25,398K | $12,686K |
| Autonomous mowers | $3,090K | $7,637K | $8,678K |
| Used machines | $3,174K | $1,925K | $1,680K |
| Parts | $8,358K | $9,501K | $5,332K |
| Shipping | $1,817K | $1,760K | $1,206K |
| Service | $660K | $720K | $677K |
| Software subscriptions | $53K | $237K | $243K |
| Total | $42,477K | $47,178K | $30,502K |
In 2025 it sold 68 harvesters at an average price of $374,000, and 52 autonomous mowers at an average of $147,000.
In the first half of 2026 it sold 56 autonomous mowers. In six months, that passed the whole of the previous year. The average price also rose, to $155,000. Harvesters were 32 units, the same number as in the same period a year earlier.
Deliveries by quarter are shown in a chart in the prospectus.
When it accepts an order, the company takes a deposit before it begins manufacturing. The deposit is generally 10% of the contract price.
Parts revenue was $9.5 million in 2025, 20% of revenue. The company gives three reasons for the increase in parts and service revenue: more machines in operation, a higher average age of the fleet, and a dedicated sales team for parts.
The software subscription is an annual contract for each autonomous mower. Revenue from it in 2025 was no more than $237,000.
Today’s autonomous mower arrived in the third flat year; revenue rose in 2025
Revenue went from $11.3 million in 2016 to $47.2 million in 2025, a little over four times in nine years. But it was not a straight line.
According to the chart in the Business section, revenue was $42.9 million in 2022, $41.5 million in 2023 and $42.5 million in 2024. For three years it was roughly flat.
In 2025 it rose $4.7 million from the year before. In the company’s explanation, the largest item is an increase of $4.55 million in autonomous mowers. Parts also rose $1.14 million, and used machines fell $1.25 million.
In 2025 a harvester sold for about $370,000 a unit and an autonomous mower for about $150,000. It is the latter whose units are growing.
Question 6
Are the numbers healthy?
Primary source · from the S-1/A
MD&A (Results of Operations, Liquidity and Capital Resources, p.55 onward), Report of the auditor and Prospectus Summary (Summary Financial Data, p.14 onward) — from the S-1/A
Three things catch. No profitable year. A net loss larger than the loss from operations. Liabilities more than four times assets.
First, the overall numbers.
| Item | 2024 | 2025 | H1 2025 | H1 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $42,477K | $47,178K | $22,909K | $30,502K |
| Gross profit | $10,195K | $9,370K | $3,837K | $7,053K |
| Operating loss | −$5,541K | −$9,317K | −$4,577K | −$2,731K |
| Change in fair value of convertible debentures | −$4,158K | −$3,570K | −$480K | −$3,642K |
| Change in fair value of warrant liabilities | −$3,616K | −$2,067K | −$943K | −$2,585K |
| Net loss | −$13,537K | −$15,122K | −$6,083K | −$9,102K |
Not one profitable year since it began operations
The accumulated deficit was about $100 million at June 30, 2026. The company writes that it may not achieve profitability in the foreseeable future, and that it cannot assure investors it ever will.
In the latest half-year, the net loss was more than three times the operating loss
The operating loss for the first half of 2026 was $2.73 million, down 40% from $4.58 million in the same period a year earlier. In these six months revenue rose 33% and the gross profit margin went from 16.75% to 23.12%.
Yet the net loss was $9.10 million, larger than the $6.08 million of the same period a year earlier. Almost all of the gap from the operating loss is two lines of the income statement, both titled “change in fair value”: $3.64 million for the convertible debentures and $2.59 million for the warrants. Together that is $6.23 million.
The company carries the convertible debentures and the warrants as liabilities at fair value, remeasured each period. When the fair value rises, the increase is a loss. The prospectus says of these fair value adjustments that they are “non-cash in nature”. It also says they may result in significant volatility in reported results.
But the breakdown in the notes shows that what is inside the two lines is not only the rise and fall in value of what was already outstanding. The $2.59 million for the warrants is, in substance, the $2.62 million fair value of the roughly 455,000 warrants newly issued together with the 2026 debentures. The roll-forward’s separate change-in-fair-value line, which covers all the warrants, is a decrease of $0.03 million.
The $3.64 million for the convertible debentures includes $1.53 million of interest accreted to principal. The interest is not paid in cash; it is added to principal. For the other periods, the notes say the same of accreted interest, and their roll-forward tables carry the fair value of newly issued warrants as a separate line.
In cash terms, net cash used in operating activities was $4.02 million in the first half of 2026. In the same period a year earlier it was $1.12 million.
Assets of $22.08 million, liabilities of $99.15 million
Total assets at June 30, 2026 were $22.08 million. Liabilities were $99.15 million, more than four times assets. The difference, stockholders’ equity, is negative $77.07 million.
Of the liabilities, $76.91 million is the fair value of the convertible debentures ($52.39 million) and of the warrants ($24.52 million).
Immediately before the listing, ATW will exchange part of the debentures and part of the warrants for preferred stock, and exercise the rest of the warrants for common stock (Question 8). The prospectus carries a pro forma calculation that assumes this exchange and certain other steps had been completed at June 30. Liabilities shrink to $38.51 million and the deficit to $16.43 million. Even on the pro forma, stockholders’ equity stays negative.
A paragraph in the audit report
Cash on hand was $4.23 million at June 30, 2026. The company estimates that, on its current operating plan, its existing cash will be sufficient to fund its operations through at least September 30, 2027; that estimate carries no date. In the same paragraph it sets out two assumptions: that interest on the debentures continues to be accreted to principal and not paid in cash, and that the debentures are converted into stock at maturity. It also says it expects to finance the next twelve months with operating revenue and other debt. There can be no guarantee, it adds, that it will be able to obtain that debt. Even with cost reductions, it says, there is no assurance that cash from operations would be sufficient for the next twelve months.
The company also discloses material weaknesses in its internal control. There are three: the control environment, including too few people with the appropriate accounting knowledge and experience; controls over the information systems that support financial reporting; and process-level controls. The chief financial officer was hired in July 2024 and a corporate controller in January 2025.
In the latest half-year the operating loss narrowed and the net loss widened. The gap is in the two “change in fair value” lines. Equity is negative even on the pro forma.
Question 7
Who runs it?
Primary source · from the S-1/A
Management (p.83 onward), Executive Compensation (p.90 onward) and Principal and Registered Stockholders (p.98 onward) — from the S-1/A
Among those who started it: a younger brother who ran a sod farm and an older brother who was a machine engineer. The CEO, since 2015, is someone else.
Among the co-founders are the Aposhian brothers. The older, Steven Aposhian, is both Chairman and Chief Technology Officer. The younger, Matthew Aposhian, is President and Chief Operating Officer.
The prospectus says the management team has decades of grass growing and harvesting experience, as well as deep engineering expertise. That expertise, in the company’s explanation, is what allowed it to understand the need for and advantages of electrification earlier than its competitors.
The CEO joined in 2015, and is the largest holder in the table
Chief Executive Officer Andrew Limpert has been CEO and a director since 2015. Before that he held several executive positions, including Chief Financial Officer, at Nasdaq-listed ProFire Energy.
The amendment (S-1/A) adds a section to the management chapter on an SEC matter in Mr. Limpert’s past. In July 2012 he settled SEC proceedings relating principally to conduct while he was associated with Belsen Getty, a registered investment adviser. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, he consented to an order finding that he had violated the Securities Act, the Exchange Act and the Investment Advisers Act.
The order barred him from association with any broker, dealer, investment adviser and the like, and from participating in an offering of penny stock, and ordered disgorgement, prejudgment interest and a civil penalty totaling about $113,000. The board, the prospectus says, considered the order and his performance at ProFire Energy and as FireFly’s CEO, and continues to believe he is qualified to serve as a director and as CEO.
In the stockholder table, Mr. Limpert’s holding is 26.83%, the largest of those listed. The figure includes shares held in the name of US Automatix LLC, an entity he controls, and stock options for 1.77 million shares exercisable within 60 days. The older brother, Steven Aposhian, is at 16.53% and the younger, Matthew Aposhian, at 6.52%.
Mr. Limpert’s total compensation for 2025 was $223,000. In the compensation table, $179,000 of that is salary. Elsewhere the prospectus says the board approved an increase in his annual base salary to $252,500, effective November 2025.
An outside director who handled listings at Nasdaq
There will be seven directors at the time of the listing. Besides the three insiders there are four, and the company writes that it expects these four to be determined to be independent directors.
The lead independent director is Liz Hocker. From December 2018 to August 2023 she was responsible at Nasdaq for new listings and capital markets in the Southwest U.S. After founding a listing consultancy and a period at the New York Stock Exchange, she has been head of listings and capital markets at the Texas Stock Exchange since November 2025.
The other three are as follows.
- JuE Wong, who was President and CEO of Olaplex Holdings
- Christopher Christensen, who founded The Ensign Group, an operator of skilled nursing and related facilities
- Peter Johansson, the CFO of CECO Environmental. He joined FireFly’s board in September 2026
Mr. Christensen bought shares from the company twice in December 2024, the month after he joined the board: 193,000 shares in all, for about $1.12 million. The purchases are disclosed as related party transactions.
Brothers among the founders. A CEO who is someone else, and the largest holder in the table. On the outside, a director who handled listings at Nasdaq.
Question 8
Who controls it?
Primary source · from the S-1/A
Principal and Registered Stockholders (p.98 onward), Description of Capital Stock and Shares Eligible for Future Resale (p.108 onward) — from the S-1/A
The stockholder with the most shares registered is not an officer. It is ATW, which has bought the debentures.
The stockholder table says it is based on 15.36 million shares of common stock outstanding at the time of the listing. The eight executive officers and directors together hold 8.19 million shares, which the table gives as 44.20% (including options and the like exercisable within 60 days). The individual percentages in Question 7 do not add up to it, and the prospectus does not say why. The Description of Capital Stock gives a different figure for the shares outstanding at the listing, 15.29 million; this article uses the table’s 15.36 million. On 15.36 million shares, ATW’s 1.53 million works out to 9.95%; on 15.29 million, to 9.99%.
Under the table’s “5% Stockholders” heading, the three largest are ATW Partners at 9.99%, Kimberly Petersen at 8.19% and Kenny Milne at 7.31%.
The one to look at in this chapter is ATW. Its share of the common stock is under one-tenth, but by the number of shares registered it is ahead of every other stockholder.
ATW has bought the debentures for about seven years
Funds managed by ATW Partners bought ten convertible debentures between July 2019 and June 2026. The original principal totals $18.3 million. The base interest rate is 11% or 15% a year, and the prospectus’s table gives January 31, 2028 as the maturity of every one of them (a schedule to the exchange agreement gives January 31, 2027 for the three oldest). Substantially all of the company’s assets are pledged as security.
Interest is not currently paid in cash; it is accreted to principal. That is because the holders have allowed it, and the rate when interest is accreted is 14% to 15% a year. At June 30, 2026, principal plus accreted interest was about $25.1 million.
Just before the listing, part of the debentures becomes stock
On October 6, 2026, the company entered into an exchange agreement with ATW. That was the day before it filed the S-1.
The prospectus describes the agreement as follows. The schedules to the agreement mark the share numbers as illustrative.
- The principal and capitalized interest of the three oldest debentures (July 2019, April 2020 and September 2020) are exchanged for a newly created preferred stock
- Part of the warrants is also exchanged for preferred stock, and the rest is exercised for common stock. ATW will hold 1.53 million shares of common stock
- The preferred stock is convertible, at ATW’s election, into 9.15 million shares of common stock
The prospectus says the 1.53 million shares ATW will hold as common stock represent 9.99% of the common stock outstanding after the listing. The preferred stock generally carries no vote. Conversion is capped as well: no conversion is allowed that would take ATW’s holding above 9.99%.
Of the 27.12 million shares registered, the number registered for ATW in the stockholder table is 13.29 million, about 49% of the total. That is more than six times the 2.16 million of the next largest, Steven Aposhian.
According to the table’s footnote, it is made up of three parts.
- 1.53 million shares of common stock
- 9.15 million shares issuable on conversion of the preferred stock
- 2.61 million shares issuable on conversion of the debentures that are not exchanged and remain outstanding
The footnote names the holders as ATW Partners and four entities, FF Opportunities 2 through 5. ATW Partners is the investment manager of FF2; FF3, FF4 and FF5 are each wholly owned by an ATW fund.
The registered numbers in the table add up to the 27.12 million on the cover. The text of the prospectus names two components of the registered total, the common stock outstanding at the listing and the shares underlying the preferred stock (“including”); the debenture shares sit in ATW’s footnote in the table. The exchange agreement filed as an exhibit also provides that the resale of the shares issuable on conversion of the debentures is to be included in this registration statement.
The prospectus cautions that the pro forma information reflecting the exchange is illustrative only and will be adjusted based on the final terms of the exchange. It also says the information in the stockholder table may change.
The remaining seven debentures are not exchanged and are expected to remain outstanding as debentures after the listing. The prospectus puts their principal and accrued interest at approximately $17.1 million and the common stock issuable on conversion at approximately 2.61 million shares. That sentence gives no date. A nearby risk factor sets the $17.1 million beside a June 30, 2026 balance, and the prospectus’s own table of the debentures as of September 30, 2026 adds up to about $17.7 million for the same seven. These, too, carry an ownership cap: 4.99% as a rule, which the holder can raise to 9.99% by giving notice. The increase takes effect 61 days after the notice.
When shares may be sold differs by stockholder
There are two kinds of agreement restricting sales (lock-ups). The prospectus says they have been agreed. What is filed as an exhibit is, in each case, an undated form. A risk factor says the company intends to enter into lock-up agreements with holders of unregistered shares, and that such agreements may be terminated early under certain circumstances. Separately, the grant agreements for the company’s outstanding stock options bar the sale of the underlying shares for 180 days after the listing. Most of the shares registered for ATW generally cannot be sold for 20 days from the listing.
certain stockholders
By the prospectus’s estimate, about 3.4 million shares will be available for sale immediately after the listing. Along the way, about 0.4 million more become available one month after the listing, about 0.6 million each month after that, and about 2.0 million 181 days after the date of the prospectus. Twelve months after the date of the prospectus, about 21.8 million are added. The estimate does not take the caps on volume into account.
Each registered stockholder decides for itself whether to sell and when. The company writes that it cannot determine the number of shares that will be sold.
Two provisions on the debentures that remain
The first is a provision that lowers the conversion price. If the company in future issues stock at a price below the conversion price of the debentures, the conversion price falls to that price, subject to limited exceptions (the prospectus’s term is full-ratchet). If the conversion price falls, the same debenture converts into more shares. The conversion prices the prospectus gives are $5.5674 to $10.58. For five of the debentures the price is set as the lower of $5.5674 and 85% of the initial public offering price.
The second is a redemption provision. Five of the remaining debentures provide that when the company raises new money by issuing stock or borrowing, it shall use 50% of the gross proceeds to redeem principal on the debentures.
Neither provision had been applied as of the notes for the end of 2025. According to the notes, the holders had waived the reduction in conversion price for the stock issued up to then, and had waived the redemption requirement for the financings up to then. How the 2026 private placement was treated is not written in the text of the prospectus. The text says the company is not currently contemplating any amendment, waiver or other modification of the terms of the debentures that will remain outstanding. The exchange agreement filed as an exhibit, for its part, waives the two provisions to the extent that the direct listing, or the issuance or conversion of the preferred stock and of the shares underlying the debentures and warrants, would trigger them, and not for any other issuance.
The debenture holders also have a right, within limits, to buy in when the company sells stock in future.
In the stockholder table, 9.99% of the common stock. By shares registered, the most: 13.29 million, about 49%. The lock-up is generally 20 days.
Question 9
What is it afraid of?
Primary source · from the S-1/A
Risk Factors (p.16 onward), MD&A (Liquidity and Capital Resources, p.62 onward) — from the S-1/A
From the risk factors, this article takes five where this company’s own circumstances are written in specifics.
It has not kept a covenant on the debentures
The debentures carry a covenant: operating cash flow during any three consecutive months must not fall below negative $650,000.
In June 2025 the debenture holders waived this breach. The company had also, without the holders’ approval, amended its certificate of incorporation to increase its authorized shares and enlarged its stock option pool. Those were waived at the same time.
The company writes that, as a result of the waivers it received, it was in compliance with the covenants on the debentures as of June 30, 2026. It also writes that there can be no guarantee the waivers will continue. If the holders were to declare the balances immediately due and payable, it says, it may not have sufficient funds, and may need to seek additional waivers or pursue a reorganization proceeding under bankruptcy or insolvency laws.
The harvester moves with housing starts
Demand for turf is affected by home construction. The company believes its harvester revenues are correlated with mortgage interest rates and housing starts.
Harvester sales fell from 72 units in 2024 to 68 in 2025. In the first half of 2026 they were 32 units, unchanged from the same period a year earlier.
The company points to another side as well. Of the more than 750 harvesters operating worldwide, over half are five or more years old, and it believes a significant replacement opportunity exists.
Suppliers are limited; the mower’s reel motors were delayed
In April 2025, the supplier of the motors used in the reels of the autonomous mower experienced delays in manufacturing and shipping. Production and shipment were delayed for some orders, and so was the recognition of the related revenue. The company is working on alternate supply relationships but writes that it may be unable to engage them in a timely manner.
A listing in which no underwriter sets an offering price
The listing is conditional on Nasdaq approving the application. If it is not approved, the prospectus says, the company will not complete the direct listing.
A direct listing has no book-building process in which banks coordinate buy and sell interest in advance to arrive at a price. The opening price is set on the day of the listing, when Nasdaq matches buy and sell orders. Neither the company nor the registered stockholders are involved in that price-setting.
The prospectus says the lack of an initial public offering price could affect the range of buy and sell orders Nasdaq collects. As a result, the share price may be more volatile than in an underwritten offering and could decline significantly and rapidly once listed.
It also addresses the rights of buyers. In a direct listing, registered and unregistered shares can begin trading at the same time. A buyer in the open market may therefore be unable to trace the shares to this registration statement. In that case, the company writes, the buyer may not be able to assert claims under Section 11 or Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act even if the registration statement contains a misstatement.
It may have to give back pandemic-era refunds
Under a tax credit for employers that kept people on payroll, the company received refunds of approximately $1.3 million in 2022 and approximately $2.4 million in 2023. The company believes it qualified when it applied. The tax authority, however, has been auditing refunds under this program aggressively. If they are disallowed, the company would have to repay them. It has accrued $3.6 million as a liability.
A debenture covenant, housing starts, a limited set of suppliers, a listing with no offering price, the refunds.
Question 10
What becomes of the money it raises?
Primary source · from the S-1/A
Use of Proceeds (p.47) and Plan of Distribution (p.131 onward), Risk Factors (p.40) and Sale Price History of Our Capital Stock (p.125) — from the S-1/A
Note: This analysis draws only on the facts in the S-1/A. This S-1/A is for a direct listing that registers the resale of shares by stockholders rather than an underwritten initial public offering, so there is no offering price. The listing date, the opening price and any trading after the listing are not in the filing and fall outside the scope of this analysis.
No money comes to the company in this listing. The use of proceeds section is two sentences of text.
The section on use of proceeds has, in this prospectus, only two sentences of text. Beyond that there is a one-line reference to another section. This is the second sentence.
The costs of the listing are paid by the company. Its financial advisor, Chardan Capital Markets, is to receive a cash advisory fee of $1.0 million, payable upon the completion of the listing. The company also reimburses its expenses (other than legal fees, up to $125,000 without its prior authorization).
Chardan’s role includes advice on structuring and planning the direct listing, as well as, on the day of the listing, determining that the shares are ready to trade, notifying Nasdaq, and approving the opening of trading at the price at that moment. Beyond that, the prospectus says, it has not been engaged to otherwise facilitate or coordinate price discovery activities or sales of the shares.
The money comes in through another door
The door through which money came to the company is outside this listing. In February and June 2026 it issued convertible debentures to ATW’s funds and borrowed $5.0 million in all.
According to the prospectus, from August 2026 it sold stock to 245 accredited investors at $8.50 a share for gross proceeds of approximately $3.4 million. The company issued about 125,000 shares to R.F. Lafferty as compensation for its services as placement agent.
This private placement also bears on the listing standards. The company writes that, with the shares issued in the private placement and otherwise, it expects to satisfy Nasdaq’s requirements on the number of holders and on the market value of unrestricted publicly held shares. It expects to have more than 400 round lot holders.
Three prices
Of the share prices that appear in the prospectus, three are set side by side here.
stock sales
placement
valuation
The $12.14 is an independent third-party valuation that the company obtained. The approximately $406 million does not equal 15.36 million shares of common stock at the listing multiplied by $12.14. What share count the valuation rests on is not stated. The company gives the figure in the context of exceeding Nasdaq’s $8.00 bid-price threshold.
The opening price on the day of the listing is set by the matching of orders on Nasdaq. The prospectus says Chardan is expected to consider past private sale prices and the like (the information in the Sale Price History section). It then cautions that this information may have little or no relation to the opening price.
The cost of an offering that was withdrawn
Expenses for 2025 include $1.12 million related to a withdrawn initial public offering. It is given as part of what increased professional fees.
The reason for the withdrawal is not written in this prospectus. Neither is the reason for choosing a direct listing.
Looking ahead, the company writes that it will need additional sources of capital. The first item in management’s plans is to raise additional liquidity through an equity raise in the public capital markets or through friends and family.
No money comes to the company from the listing, and a $1.0 million advisory fee goes out. The funding has come through debentures and a private placement.
In closing
Beyond the ten questions
What FireFly Robotics sells is machines for turf. It began operations in 2010, and revenue went from $11.3 million in 2016 to $47.2 million in 2025. From 2024 it added today’s autonomous mower. In the first half of 2026 it sold 56 of them, passing the whole of the previous year in six months. The operating loss for those six months was smaller than in the same period a year earlier.
But there has not been one profitable year. The accumulated deficit is about $100 million. Liabilities are more than four times assets, and the audit report says there is substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern. The debentures have been bought by ATW’s funds. The company has in the past failed to keep a covenant on them and has received waivers.
And in this listing, no money comes to the company. What is registered is only resales by stockholders, and of the 27.12 million shares, 13.29 million, about 49%, are for ATW. The period in which most of ATW’s shares cannot be sold is generally 20 days from the listing. After that, until 12 months, there is a cap on how much can be sold. The company itself writes that it will need additional capital. What becomes saleable in this listing is not stock the company sells for proceeds. It is stock that stockholders sell.
LIGHT
Light
• 56 autonomous mowers sold in six months (25 in the year-earlier period). Order backlog of 76 units• Revenue up 33% in the first half of 2026. Gross profit margin from 16.75% to 23.12%• Operating loss narrowed from $4.58 million to $2.73 million (first half of 2026 against the first half of 2025; for the full year 2025 it widened)• No customer above 10% of revenues in 2024 or 2025. Parts are one-fifth of revenue (2025)• With the ATW exchange and related steps, liabilities go from $99.15 million to $38.51 million (pro forma)
SHADOW
Shadow
• A net loss every year since it began operations in 2010. Accumulated deficit of about $100 million• Substantial doubt about going concern in the audit report. Material weaknesses in internal control• No money comes to the company from the listing. A $1.0 million advisory fee• About 49% of the registered shares (13.29 million) are for ATW. The lock-up is generally 20 days• A debenture covenant not kept in the past, and waived. Remaining debentures of approximately $17.1 million, as stated in the prospectus
The prospectus introduces the company as an agricultural technology and robotics company and puts forward a market of about $60 billion. The same document also says that a little over half of 2025 revenue was a harvester a person rides (the prospectus calls it the Manned Robotic Harvester), that there has been no profitable year, and that in this listing the company receives no proceeds when stockholders sell. The date on which trading begins is blank, and the opening price will be set by the matching of orders on Nasdaq.
That judgment is now in your hands.
Source: All facts are drawn from FireFly Robotics, Inc.’s S-1/A (accession 0001493152-26-048609, filed 2026-10-27), together with the exhibits filed with the original S-1 on 2026-10-07 for the exchange agreement and the lock-up forms (Exhibits 10.7, 10.42 and 10.43).